LOCKETT SYMPOSIUM

IS THE SUPREME COURT’S COMMAND ON MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES A SPOONFUL OF SUGAR WITH A
POISON PILL FOR THE DEATH PENALTY?
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier*
Achieving the proper balance between clear guidelines that assure relative equality of treatment, and discretion to consider individual factors
whose weight cannot always be preassigned, is no easy task in any sentencing system. Where life itself is what hangs in the balance, a fine
precision in the process must be insisted upon. 1

A major portion of the tale of the history of the death penalty in the
United States features the ways that the death penalty system has shifted
from a mandatory system to one with complete jury discretion and then
eventually settling somewhere in between. A key part of this resolution
came through the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Lockett v. Ohio. 2
Lockett was important in many ways, largely because it ensured a
fairer death penalty by protecting the constitutional right of defendants to
introduce mitigating factors in death penalty cases. But in creating a fairer
death penalty, it may also have undermined the death penalty itself by
making it more like the death penalty the Supreme Court had found
unconstitutional in 1972.
Part One of this essay briefly discusses the history of the basic
sentencing structure of the United States death penalty. Part Two briefly
explains some of the historical significance of Lockett v. Ohio. Part Three
addresses how Lockett made the death penalty fairer and indirectly saved
the death penalty, while perhaps also planting the seeds for the demise of
the U.S. death penalty.
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1. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 620 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring).
2. Id.
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I. THE EARLY AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY
By the time the Bill of Rights, which included the Eighth
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments, was ratified in 1791,
every state in the United States followed England’s common-law practice
of using a mandatory death penalty sentencing system. 3 Under such a
system, a capital defendant generally automatically received the death
penalty upon conviction of a capital crime. 4
Such a mandatory system, however, created problems. For example,
when faced with a sympathetic but guilty defendant, jurors would acquit
the defendant of the capital charges if they wished for the defendant to
live. 5
In the early 1800s, states began trying to temper the harshness of the
system and to address the jury nullification problem by providing jurors
with sentencing discretion. 6 Thus, once a jury found a defendant guilty of
a capital offense, the jury had discretion of whether or not to impose a
death sentence. 7
Tennessee, Alabama, and Louisiana became the first states to use
discretionary sentencing systems. 8 Between the Civil War and the
beginning of the twentieth century, twenty additional U.S. jurisdictions
adopted discretionary sentencing in capital cases. 9 In 1897, Congress also
adopted a discretionary sentencing scheme for the federal death penalty. 10
And by 1963, the federal government and every state with a death penalty
used the discretionary system. 11

3. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976) (citing HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 5-6, 27-28 (rev. ed. 1967)).
4. In the 13th century, English common law made all criminal homicides “prima facie capital,
but all were subject to the benefit of clergy, which after 1350 came to be available to almost any man
who could read.” McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197 (1971). Subsequently, common law
limited the types of homicides that made one eligible for capital punishment, but the punishment
remained mandatory for those types of killings. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289. “As at common law, all
homicides that were not involuntary, provoked, justified, or excused constituted murder and were
automatically punished by death.” Id.
5. Id. at 290-91.
6. JEFFREY L. KIRCHMEIER, IMPRISONED BY THE PAST: WARREN MCCLESKEY AND THE
AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY 58 (2015) (hereinafter IMPRISONED BY THE PAST).
7. “In order to meet the problem of jury nullification, legislatures did not try, as before, to
refine further the definition of capital homicides. Instead they adopted the method of forthrightly
granting juries the discretion which they had been exercising in fact.” McGautha, 402 U.S. at 199
(citations omitted).
8. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 294.
11. Id. at 291-92.
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This discretionary system created what appeared to be a fairer death
penalty system, but there was another result that some legislators likely
intended, at least in some jurisdictions. Giving jurors more discretion also
allowed for improper considerations. 12 Thus, jurors were permitted to
express racial prejudices in their disparate treatment of capital defendants
based on the race of the defendants and the race of the victims. 13
This discretionary system created other problems. When sentencers
were given so much discretion, the results among different juries were
inconsistent and arbitrary. And “these procedures left juries free to impose
sentence based on whatever criteria they liked, without regard to their
legitimacy or their relevance to the sentencing decision.” 14
Eventually, in Furman v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
such discretionary systems violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 15 While the Justices in the majority all wrote separate
opinions and did not agree on a single reasoning, one theme that emerged
from several of the opinions was a concern about the arbitrary and
unpredictable results from such a system. 16 For example, Justice Douglas
found the discretionary capital sentencing system “pregnant with
discrimination.” 17 And Justice Stewart noted that such a system allowed
the death penalty to be imposed “wantonly” and “freakishly.” 18
Several years later, the Court held that a mandatory death sentencing
system also violates the Constitution. 19 By contrast, at the same time, in
Gregg v. Georgia, the Court upheld a sentencing system that tried to forge
a middle ground between automatic death sentences and discretionary
sentences. 20
Although the exact procedures varied by state, 21 in general, this
constitutional sentencing scheme provides sentencing jurors (or judges)

12. “From the 1930s until the 1967 moratorium, nearly 50 percent of the offenders executed
for murder nationwide were black. In the South the figure exceeded 60 percent.” DAVID C. BALDUS,
GEORGE G. WOODWORTH, AND CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY
9 (1990) [hereinafter EQUAL JUSTICE].
13. Stuart Banner, Traces of Slavery: Race and the Death Penalty in Historical Perspective, in
FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE 100, 111 (Charles J. Ogletree Jr. and Austin Sarat ed.,
2006).
14. EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 9.
15. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
16. See generally id.
17. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
19. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976).
20. 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
21. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269 (1976) (discussing Texas’s capital sentencing
procedure that requires jurors to answer three questions).

68

CONLAWNOW

[10:65

with a list of guidelines, or aggravating factors, that make a defendant
eligible for the death penalty. 22 Also, a defendant’s attorney can introduce
mitigating factors to argue for a sentence less than death. At the time of
Gregg, it was unclear how far the constitutional command for mitigating
factors reached, but the landmark decision of Lockett v. Ohio clarified that
issue.
II. THE IMPACT OF LOCKETT V. OHIO
The Court’s rejection of automatic death sentences in Woodson v.
North Carolina and Roberts v. Louisiana created a constitutional
command of individualized sentencing, where sentencers must be
permitted in capital cases to determine the appropriate sentence for the
individual, not just for the crime. 23 Jurors are able to consider aspects of
an individual defendant through the introduction of mitigating
circumstances.
Lockett v. Ohio clarified that constitutional individualized sentencing
did not merely mean that a court had to allow jurors to consider some
aspects of the defendant. 24 In Lockett, Ohio’s death penalty statute was
found unconstitutional because the statute limited the mitigating factors a
capital jury could weigh. 25 The plurality broadly concluded that a
sentencing jury should “not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death.” 26
Lockett’s command created one of the most important constitutional
principles in capital sentencing. In short, “Lockett entitles a capital
defendant to present any mitigating evidence [the defendant] wishes,
whether or not it falls within the scope of a specific statutory mitigating

22. “[T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an
arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing
authority is given adequate information and guidance.” Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (White, J., concurring
in the judgment). Interestingly, prior to the decision in Furman, no state that had modified its death
penalty law between 1959 and 1971 had decided to adopt the American Law Institute’s 1959 Model
Penal Code recommendation to provide statutory criteria for imposing the death penalty. McGautha,
402 U.S. at 202-03.
23. Woodson, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976). See
also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 261 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 277 (1976).
24. 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
25. Id. at 608-09.
26. Id. at 604 (emphasis in original).
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circumstance.” 27 Subsequent Supreme Court cases such as Eddings v.
Oklahoma 28 reinforced and expanded Lockett’s conclusion that courts and
legislatures may not prevent jurors from considering mitigating factors, as
long as the evidence meets the Court’s definition of mitigation. 29
Lockett ensured that jurors would have significant information about
a capital defendant before sentencing the defendant. The doctrine of
mitigating circumstances revealed a range of relevant evidence, including
details about facts that may help explain how a defendant came to commit
a horrible crime. A social scientist examining decades of cases about
evidence of mitigating factors would gain insight into the causes of crime
and our understandings of human nature.
Without the holding of Lockett, the American death penalty would
be harsher and more unfair. If jurors did not know the important details
about a capital defendant, they would not be able to fully assess a
defendant’s culpability. And many people who might have otherwise been
sentenced to death were saved by the commands of Lockett. 30
Further, Lockett eventually laid the groundwork for some instances
where the death penalty was categorically narrowed. In 2002, the Supreme
Court held that defendants with an intellectual disability cannot be
sentenced to death. 31 More than a decade earlier, the Court had approved
of such executions. 32 But through years of developing law and science on

27. Stephen P. Garvey, As the Gentle Rain from Heaven: Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1000 (1996). See also Scott E. Sunby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling
Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1157
(1991) (discussing how Chief Justice Burger’s plurality opinion defined what mitigating evidence is
relevant under the constitution).
28. 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (holding that sentence must be permitted to consider evidence of
defendant’s troubled youth as mitigating).
29. “In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the court took the next step and held that not only must the
sentencer be permitted to consider all potentially mitigating evidence, but that the Eighth Amendment
prohibited the sentencer from ‘refus[ing] to consider, as a matter of law any relevant mitigating
evidence.’” Sam Kamin and Justin Marceau, Waking the Furman Giant, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981,
1000 (2015) (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15)). See also, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476
U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (requiring sentencer to be able to consider defendant’s adjustment to incarceration
as a mitigating factor)). See also Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 395 (1987) (concluding that trial
judge’s instruction that did not allow advisory jury to weigh non-statutory mitigating factors violated
the constitution); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 76 (1987) (holding that even in a situation where
a life-sentenced prisoner commits murder, mitigation still must be considered).
30. See, e.g., Louis D. Bilonis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett
Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 286 (1991-1992) (asserting that “[t]he Lockett doctrine
is the primary legal tool for ensuring that each decision to employ the death penalty is well grounded
in morality”).
31. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
32. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (holding that execution of intellectually
disabled individuals does not violate the constitution).
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intellectual disability as a mitigating circumstance, such defendants were
eventually completely excluded from the death penalty. Similarly, long
before the Court held that juveniles cannot be sentenced to death in 2002,
lawyers and experts litigated the role that age plays as a mitigating
circumstance. 33 Thus, for its role in limiting the death penalty for
individuals and for excluding classes of defendants, Lockett remains one
of the most important Supreme Court decisions on the death penalty.
III.

LOCKETT AS A POISON PILL FOR THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY

Yet, even as one may sing the praises of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lockett, one may also consider the side-effects of the Court’s
main holding. Had the Court come to a different conclusion and allowed
legislatures to limit mitigating factors, would we still have the death
penalty? Assuming that states would have seized the opportunity to
exclude some mitigating circumstances, society might have become more
outraged about the harshness of capital punishment. In other words, if
states had begun cutting back on allowing jurors to consider mitigating
circumstances, we might have ended up with something nearer to the
mandatory death penalty system that many in society had previously
rejected. And if we were nearer to a mandatory death penalty, the Supreme
Court in the 1980s or 1990s might have invalidated the death penalty
again, perhaps for good.
But the Court did decide Lockett to ensure defendants may introduce
a broad range of mitigating circumstances. So, a more useful exercise is
to evaluate the death penalty that Lockett did create. The decision took us
further away from the unconstitutional mandatory death penalty system
from the country’s early years. And that was a good result. But, on the
other hand, it brought us nearer to the arbitrary death penalty of the
discretionary system used in the 1900s until it was found unconstitutional
in Furman.
Because Lockett allowed a defendant to introduce any mitigating
evidence, 34 the American death penalty system began to look like the pre33. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that it violates the constitution to
execute defendants who were under eighteen at the time of the crime). Prior to Roper, defendants
under eighteen could be executed. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (where the
plurality of the Court held that it violated the constitution to execute an offender who was under the
age of sixteen at the time of the crime); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments did not proscribe the execution of juvenile offenders over
fifteen but under eighteen).
34. The Court has allowed some limits on how a sentencer considers mitigating evidence. In
Johnson v. Texas, the Court considered whether or not special questions in Texas’s capital sentencing
statute permitted jurors to consider the defendant’s young age as mitigating. Johnson, 509 U.S. at
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Furman system where jurors considered a broad range of information to
make their decision with little or no guidance. If that is the result from
Lockett, one might surmise that the decision was a poison pill for the death
penalty. Whether or not any of the Justices foresaw the effects, the
arbitrariness built into a system that allows unlimited mitigation could
make the death penalty violate the constitution under the commands of
Furman.
Several commentators have embraced this theory that the modern
death penalty is unconstitutionally arbitrary. For example, one writer has
argued that “[w]here a jury can consider any mitigating factors, and assign
them any weight it chooses, jury discretion is not guided or channeled,”
resulting in a jury exercising “unguided discretion.” 35
Justice Antonin Scalia eventually rejected the commands of Lockett
for this same reason. In a 1990 concurring opinion, he concluded that
Lockett’s mitigation requirement “quite obviously destroys whatever
rationality and predictability the [requirement of clear and objective
standards to provide detailed guidance] was designed to achieve.” 36
Similarly, Justice Harry Blackmun found Lockett’s command of
individualized sentencing inconsistent with the Constitution’s other
requirement from Furman of eliminating arbitrariness and discrimination
in the capital punishment system. 37 Thus, he concluded that the
inconsistency made the death penalty unconstitutional. 38
But other commentators have argued that the post-Lockett death
penalty differs from the pre-Furman discretionary death penalty in
354. The Court, however, held that Lockett only requires that a jury be permitted to weigh mitigating
evidence and that the jury does not have to “be able to give effect to mitigating evidence in every
conceivable manner in which the evidence might be relevant.” Id. at 372. Thus, the Court upheld the
death sentence because the jury might consider the mitigating factor of youth for how it affected the
question about defendant’s future dangerousness. Id. at 371-72.
35. Chaka M. Patterson, Race and the Death Penalty: The Tension Between Individualized
Justice and Racially Neutral Standards, 2 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 45, 68 (1995). “Thus, the Lockett
Court moved from favoring weak discretion back to favoring strong discretion.” Id. See also Jeffrey
L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and
Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 361-62 (1998) (noting
how allowing a broad range of mitigating factors creates an unlimited number of variables in the
sentencing process).
36. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664-65 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Cf. Scott E.
Sunby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital
Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1147, 1207 (1991) (stating that Justice Scalia’s “viewpoint stands in
contrast to that of the Lockett plurality, which crafted its inclusive definition of mitigating evidence
precisely because it believed that more reliable death penalty decisions would result”) (alteration in
original).
37. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143-44 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for writ of certiorari).
38. See id.
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constitutionally significant ways. They stress that the modern death
penalty still provides guidance in the form of aggravating factors, i.e.,
jurors cannot impose the death penalty unless they find a statutory
aggravating factor. While the introduction of unharnessed mitigating
factors may then introduce some arbitrariness, it is only arbitrariness with
respect to the decision not to impose the death penalty. 39 And that
arbitrariness only occurs after the group of death-eligible defendants has
been narrowed by an initial finding of one or more aggravating factors. 40
Thus, the Court has explained that aggravating factors serve to rationally
narrow the category of offenders eligible for the death penalty, while
mitigating circumstances allow an individualized assessment of the
punishment for the death-eligible defendant. 41
In other words, the Constitution allows arbitrary decisions not to
impose a death sentence, but does not permit such arbitrariness in the
decision to sentence someone to death. Any inconsistency allowed by
Lockett occurs among those cases with at least one aggravating factor.
That, arguably, is not as constitutionally significant as jurors using
unbridled discretion for every convicted murderer. As one commentator
has reasoned, “While inconsistency is not ideal, the consistency objection
states a lesser evil than the type of pre-Furman arbitrariness that risked
significant over-inclusion of offenders who committed insufficiently
culpable offenses” 42

39. “Lockett and Furman can be reconciled in that Lockett returned discretion to the jury only
with regard to mitigating circumstances. Thus, after Lockett, constitutionally valid death penalty
statutes must carefully guide the jury’s consideration of aggravating circumstances, yet allow the jury
broad discretion to consider mitigating factors.” Miranda B. Strassman, Note, Mills v. Maryland: The
Supreme Court Guarantees the Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 907,
920 (1989).
40. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 870-72 (1983) (discussing the narrowing function
of aggravating circumstances). “To pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing scheme must
‘genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.’”
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 877). For
more on the Eighth Amendment narrowing requirement, see Sam Kamin and Justin Marceau, Waking
the Furman Giant, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981, 986-98 (2015).
41. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 317 (1989); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
664-65 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). As Chief Justice Burger noted in Lockett, under the view of
the three Justices at the heart of Gregg, “Furman did not require that all sentencing discretion be
eliminated, but only that it be ‘directed and limited’ so that the death penalty would be imposed in a
more consistent and rational manner and so that there would be a ‘meaningful basis for distinguishing
the . . . cases in which it is imposed from . . . the many cases in which it is not.’” Lockett, 438 U.S. at
601 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 188, 189 (1976)) (emphasis added).
42. Robert Smith, Forgetting Furman, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1149, 1161 (2015): “Arbitrariness is
now mostly about consistency and not desert.”

2018]

COMMAND ON MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

73

Yet, while there is some difference between arbitrarily imposing the
death penalty and arbitrarily granting leniency, one may still argue there
is little practical difference. States often employ broad death penalty
statutes with many aggravating factors, meaning that little narrowing
actually occurs before jurors are given the discretion to weigh mitigating
factors. 43
Of course, the Supreme Court has yet to find that today’s death
penalty is unconstitutionally arbitrary. But one may still ponder whether
at some point the Court will conclude otherwise. In that situation, Lockett
will have been a poison pill all along, waiting to invalidate the death
penalty. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court Justices deciding in Lockett
intended it that way, but the logic of the decision may inevitably still lead
to the collapse of the death penalty. Although a majority of the Justices
have yet to see Lockett this way, Justices Blackmun and Scalia both saw
Lockett and its progeny as undermining the constitutionality of the death
penalty.
One of the strongest arguments for the unconstitutionality of the
Lockett death penalty was made in McCleskey v. Kemp. 44 In that decision,
the African-American Warren McCleskey presented a sophisticated
statistical study to argue that racial bias in the system invalidated his death
sentence. 45 One of the sources where racial bias is allowed to enter the
system is through jurors’ discretion (as well as by the discretion of others
like prosecutors). By a 5-4 decision, however, the Supreme Court rejected
McCleskey’s constitutional claims. Yet, studies continue to reveal racial
bias in the system. 46 The McCleskey Court’s evaluation of the evidence of
disparities permitted by Lockett was the most recent instance where the
Court came close to finding the death penalty unconstitutional. 47 Because
of this country’s history of racial violence and because that racial bias
appears throughout the criminal justice system, standards providing juries
more discretion also allow for more discrimination.
These arbitrariness problems are built into the Lockett capital
punishment system. There are at least three significant ways that

43. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 35, at 397- 431. Lockett is
not the only reason that arbitrariness seeps into the death penalty system after one or more statutory
aggravating factors are found. Many states also permit nonstatutory aggravating factors at that stage
as well as victim impact evidence. Id. at 375-86.
44. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987).
45. Id. at 286-88.
46. KIRCHMEIER, IMPRISONED BY THE PAST, supra note 6, at 310-15.
47. Id. at 160-62.
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arbitrariness still leaks into the system related to Lockett. 48 First,
prosecutors generally maintain wide discretion in the decision of whether
or not to seek the death penalty. The choice may depend on the individual
prosecutor. This arbitrariness may have less to do with Lockett’s rule on
mitigating circumstances than other sources of arbitrariness. But at least
in some cases, a prosecutor’s choice may depend on that prosecutor’s
assessment of the mitigating circumstances allowed by Lockett.
A second way that arbitrariness enters the system is through defense
attorneys. The quality of defense may affect the outcome of the case. Even
if counsel’s performance is not so bad as to constitute constitutional
ineffective assistance of counsel, an attorney’s decisions, investigation,
and understanding of mitigating circumstances such as mental health
issues affects the outcome of cases. 49
A third way that the Supreme Court’s command on mitigating
circumstances may add arbitrariness to death penalty sentences is the way
that jurors weigh the mitigating evidence presented by defense lawyers.
Each juror brings their own beliefs to the jury room, therefore how much
weight a mitigating factor receives may vary drastically from juror to
juror. 50
A study by the Capital Juror Project discovered that different jurors
generally give different weight to different mitigating factors. 51 And a
significant portion of jurors fail to give any mitigating weight to some
mitigating factors. For example, only about a fifth of the jurors surveyed
said they would give significant weight to the mitigating factors of lack

48. Besides the three listed sources or arbitrariness, other sources include vague and overbroad
aggravating factors. Additionally, this article discusses arbitrariness within a jurisdiction’s death
penalty. There is a broader arbitrariness when one considers how the death penalty is applied or not
applied across the country or even within one state with the use of the death penalty varying widely
from county-to-county.
49. See, e.g., Russell Stetler and W. Bradley Wendel, The ABA Guidelines and the Norms of
Capital Defense Representation, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635, 643-45 (2013). On a related note, a
defense attorney’s ability to communicate with a client may also affect how that client–and the client’s
family–cooperate with an investigation into the defendant’s mental health issues. See, e.g., Sarah Hur,
Note, An Attorney’s Dilemma: Representing a Mentally Incompetent Client Who Does Not Wish to
Raise Mental Illness Issues in Court, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 555, 557-58 (2014); Bradley A.
MacLean, Effective Capital Defense Representation and the Difficult Client, 76 TENN. L. REV. 661,
662-63 (2009).
50. “Individual jurors bring to their deliberations ‘qualities of human nature and varieties of
human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable.’” McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987) (quoting Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972)).
51. See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors
Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1538-39 (1998).
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of a criminal record, a co-defendant who received a life sentence, or that
the crime was committed under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 52
The study found that, as a whole, jurors give the most mitigating
weight to the circumstances of residual doubt, youthfulness, and
intellectual disability. 53 Even then, a significant number of jurors still do
not give much weight to those factors. 54
Additionally, only a third of jurors would give some weight to the
mitigating factor that the defendant had been seriously abused as a child. 55
The study concluded, “[N]otions of collective or societal responsibility
for shaping the defendant’s character played some role in jurors’ capital
sentencing decision, especially if it appeared that the defendant tried to
get help for his problems but society somehow failed him.” 56 Yet, a juror’s
own beliefs about individual responsibility “played a larger role.”57
The Court’s decision in Lockett recognized that sentencers should be
given more information before condemning a fellow human being to
death. But in mandating that jurors be given the opportunity to understand
the failings of human nature, the Court’s decision also allowed the failings
of human nature to affect the sentencing process.
The Lockett Court likely did not anticipate the disparities that would
result from the constitutional command about mitigating circumstances.
Having rejected mandatory and discretionary death penalty systems,
though, the Court had little choice but to try a middle way. Lockett became
the Court’s grand attempt to guide states to craft a fair and constitutional
death penalty. Yet, the experiment that resulted from the command of
Lockett ultimately failed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the post-Gregg death penalty has survived for decades,
evidence continues to accumulate about unfair disparities in the capital
punishment system. While the Supreme Court has yet to find that the
arbitrariness rises to the same unconstitutional level that existed at the
time of Furman, the Court may one day reassess the modern death
penalty.
52. Id. at 1562-65.
53. Id. at 1563-64.
54. Id. Even for the mitigating factor of residual doubt about guilt, which was the most
powerful mitigating factor, a significant number of jurors did not give it much weight. More than a
third of jurors revealed that such doubts made no difference in sentencing. Id.
55. Id. at 1562-63, 1565.
56. Id. at 1565.
57. Id.
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Lockett v. Ohio remains a landmark decision that ensured jurors can
evaluate defendants as individuals rather than as categories. The case
saved countless lives and led to a fairer jurisprudence that also created
research providing new understandings about the causes of crime. It
injected more compassion and mercy into our capital punishment system.
But at the same time, the decision allowing jurors to balance the
imperfections of human beings carved a hole revealing the imperfections
of the death penalty itself. More juror discretion led to more fairness, but
it also created cracks in the capital sentencing system by allowing more
humanity and discretion. After all, “To err is human.” 58
Over time, Lockett’s impact revealed that it is impossible to have a
fair, equal, and humane death penalty. Lockett planted the seeds of
unconstitutionality within the modern death penalty when the Supreme
Court had no other constitutional option for saving the death penalty when
faced with the possible return to the days of harsh mandatory death
sentences. Today, those Lockett seeds continue to grow and support the
developing case for eliminating the death penalty in the United States.

58. Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism, Part II, line 525 (1711), in THE POEMS OF
ALEXANDER POPE 160 (ed. John Butt) (1963) (“To err is Human; to Forgive, Divine”).

